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David Neil & Company Printers Dorking Surrey

# Massacre in Rwanda

**AARON SEGAL**

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AARON SEGAL is an American Research Student preparing a thesis on Closer Union and Federation in East Africa, and co-author with Carl Rosberg, Jr., of *East African Federation*. He visited Rwanda this year.

FABIAN RESEARCH SERIES 240



FABIAN SOCIETY

11, Dartmouth Street, S.W.1

891500332



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April, 1964


# Massacre in Rwanda

AARON SEGAL

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## I. Introduction

**T**HE tiny Central African Republic of Rwanda has appeared on the world scene with a bloody and gruesome splash. Its leaders have been accused of genocide and its population of appalling acts of brutality and mass murder. The organs of the international news media focussed briefly on Rwanda, revealing an outburst of horror, and then moved on to other trouble-spots. But the inquest on Rwanda has yet to be held. Although the bloodletting has momentarily halted there is a strong chance that it will start again unless the underlying causes are removed.

This pamphlet aims to explain and to suggest how to remove these underlying causes. A brief introduction to the circumstances of Rwanda, its geography, history, economic, political and social structure is needed in order to render intelligible the seeming incomprehensibility of mass murder, whether premeditated or spontaneously provoked. There can be no justification or rationalisation for the killing of women and children and whole families. There can however be an accounting of what prompted such behaviour, the roots of which lie in the political and social history of this troubled country.

Rwanda is today one of the world's most unfortunate countries, besodden with tragedy which may erupt again at any time. The country lives in a constant garrison state of military alert, its economy has been shattered to the point of near paralysis, and the standard of living of its population reduced to the barest of subsistence levels. Its borders are thronged with thousands of refugees who are kept alive on the most meagre rations only through the grace of external aid.

Yet the full dimensions of Rwanda's tragedy have yet to be realised. The long-standing and profound economic and social problems of the country promise a perpetuation and worsening of its current misery even if the immediate danger is removed.

Is there any hope amid this chaos? Not unless measures are taken to end the military threat to the country's existence, resettle its refugees in neighbouring countries, restore the monetary sector of the Rwanda economy to life, and prepare the long-term economic and social development of the country. External assistance is required if Rwanda is not to remain a permanent stain on the world's memory and conscience.



## 2. Background to Tragedy

**R**WANDA is somewhat larger than Wales or Vermont and lies sandwiched between the Nile and Congo River basins on a dorsal spine of extinct craters rising from 6,750 to 9,000 feet. Although the country abuts the Equator, due to the elevation the climate is mild. Rainfall is ample but irregular and the country is pock-marked by eroded and denuded areas, the result of human and livestock overpopulation.

Geographically, Rwanda is isolated and landlocked, lying 1,000 miles from the Indian Ocean and 1,600 from the Atlantic. Lake Kivu on the west and the swamps of the Kagera River Valley on the east provide natural frontiers with Congo (Leopoldville) and Tanganyika. The northern and southern boundaries with Uganda and Burundi respectively are demarcated by ethnographic rather than natural features. But there are Tutsi in both Tanganyika and Uganda, and the Uganda boundary is by no means clear.

Rwanda has the highest population density in Africa South of the Sahara with 245 persons per square mile and an annual increase rate of 3 per cent. Rwanda is unique in having the highest population density of any area in the world where there is no village life. Its people prefer to live in family clusters on isolated hillsides rather than in organised villages. This fact is critical for an understanding of the country's problems.

### The People

Rwanda's present population density is the result of two waves of conquest. The original inhabitants of Rwanda are thought to have been a pygmoid people known as the Twa who are hunters and collectors of fruits, seeds and roots. Today they constitute less than 1 per cent of the population.

The first conquerors were an agricultural Bantu people known as Hutu who are characterized by woolly hair, flat broad noses, thick lips often everted and middle stature. The Hutu began by conquering the forest, felling trees, clearing the brush with their hoes and paving the way for intensive cultivation. Their political system was based upon clan chiefs grouping together several families to organise the cultivation of a single hillside. There was no centralised political system and land was owned communally through the clan. The Hutu today constitute 85 per cent of Rwanda's three million people.

About four centuries ago a tall, slender, haughty, exquisitely aristocratic people known as the Tutsi began the second conquest of Rwanda. Reputed to have come originally from Ethiopia or the Nile Valley, the Tutsi were the outer fringe of a great southbound pastoral migration which resulted in the formation of the Interlacustrine Bantu societies clustered around Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika and Lake Albert. The Tutsi constitute less than 15 per cent of the population of Rwanda.

The Tutsi conquest of Rwanda and the Hutu was achieved through a subtle combination of persuasion and force. The highly organised and centralised Tutsi entered the country under the banner of their autocratic

king, known as the Mwami, whose army was formed of a series of military lords and warrior groups. Nomadic pastoralists, the Tutsi subsisted on the milk and blood of their cattle. They negotiated with individual Hutu clan chiefs to provide protection for the clans in exchange for the Hutu accepting Tutsi lords as their patrons. Where Hutu chiefs resisted they were defeated by the superior military organisation and resources of the Tutsi. In other cases the Tutsi used inheritance and succession disputes to usurp the authority of Hutu chiefs. The Hutu were awed by the apparently superior might and elegant values of the aristocratic Tutsi. They particularly succumbed to the Tutsi's regard for the sleek long-horned cattle which the Tutsi value above all other goods. The Hutu were already encroaching upon the edges of the last remaining forests and in the conflict between agricultural and pastoral people for land they were bound to lose. Facing the prospect of a marginal existence in which famine constantly threatened due to the competition between man and beast, Hutu and Tutsi, for arable land, the Hutu plumped overwhelmingly for security. This they sought to achieve by entering into a contract with individual Tutsi lords in order to obtain cattle and protection. They provided the Tutsi lord in exchange with free labour, gifts, personal services, foodstuffs, and exclusive title to all cattle and land.

This contractual relationship between patron and client was known as the *Buhake*, whereby "an individual, Hutu or Tutsi, who had an inferior social prestige and who was less well provided with cattle, offered his services to and asked protection from a person whose status was higher and whose wealth was greater".<sup>1</sup> The relationship could be broken off by either party but if the patron dissolved the contract then he received all the cattle which he had provided to his client. Individual patrons were in turn the clients of more powerful lords in a hierarchy reaching upwards to the Mwami who was the absolute autocratic ruler of Rwanda having title to all land and all cattle. Around the Mwami's court were grouped the army chiefs, the elders who controlled the rules of succession to the Mwamiship, and the sons of chiefs and sub-chiefs who received an education in military and aristocratic values at the court.

### Caste Society

This feudal system of domination and exploitation flourished in both Rwanda and Burundi and developed a rigid caste society based upon beliefs in the inherent inequality of human beings. This belief was reinforced by the physical and cultural differences between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa.

According to legend, the first King of Rwanda had three sons, Gatutsi, Gahutu and Gatwa. Nearing his death he gave each of his sons a pot of milk to guard overnight in order to test their merits to succeed him. Gatutsi faithfully stayed awake to guard the pot and returned it to his father full the next day. Gahutu dozed off and letting the pot spill returned it half-empty. The gluttonous Gatwa guzzled down the milk and came back empty-handed. Therefore the King chose Gatutsi as his successor, to be

<sup>1</sup> Maquet, J., *The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda*, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 129.



forever exempt from manual labour, making Gahutu who lacked self-control his perennial serf and banishing the avaricious Gatwa from the human world.

Rwanda society was thus based on a hierarchy of superior-inferior relationships which enabled a small and highly self-conscious minority to enjoy a style of living and exemption from manual labour through the "moderate and clever exploitation of the majority".<sup>1</sup> The effective retention of all cattle by Tutsi enabled them to dole out benefits, security and status to Hutu whose labour enabled the Tutsi to indulge in the pleasures of a leisure class. Tutsi lyric poetry praises the cow "Who saves me the shame and fatigue of the hoe".<sup>2</sup>

The Tutsi were able to maintain this feudal system because their values and in particular the acceptance of the fundamental inequality of man became entrenched throughout the population, because the small size of the country enabled the King to maintain a centralised system of communication and administration, and because the primitive methods of cultivation, poor soil and irregular rainfall produced a very marginal economic surplus which necessitated very judicious and moderate use of tributes, levies and compulsory labour.

### European Penetration

The first European to enter the Kingdom of Rwanda was the young German explorer, Count Goetzin in 1894. Although there was extensive commercial contact between Rwanda and Arab and Swahili traders, the country's mountainous nature and isolation kept it off the main routes of European penetration. But both Rwanda and Burundi had been included in the sphere of interest accorded to Germany by the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890.

German rule arrived in Rwanda in 1899 through an oral agreement obtained from the Mwami accepting the Imperial Government's Protection. The Germans never maintained more than a handful of officials in Rwanda and made no attempt to interfere with the traditional political system. The most significant aspect of their rule in Rwanda was undoubtedly the introduction under their aegis of Christian missions into the country.

The first missionaries to arrive were the Catholic White Fathers under the remarkable Monsignor Hirth. Hirth hoped to capture the country through the conversion of the Tutsi élite at the court but the Mwami held the Catholics off by insisting that they provide only secular instruction at the court. But Catholicism had a vivid appeal for the oppressed Hutu who could obtain through it access to jobs and status hitherto denied them because of their birth. Although by 1922 the Catholics had succeeded in converting the court and the leading Tutsi lords, the hitherto unknown and highly revolutionary doctrine for Rwanda of the fundamental equality of all Christians in the eyes of Christ had been let loose in the land.

Meanwhile Belgian forces from the Congo had occupied Rwanda and

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 141.

<sup>2</sup> *Le Ruanda-Urundi*, Brussels 1959, Office of Information and Public Relations for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi.

Burundi in 1916 and this occupation was confirmed by the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. President Wilson was adamant that German colonies were not to be war booty for the victors yet it was generally acknowledged that Belgium had suffered most from German occupation and war devastation and that the Germans were highly unlikely to be able to meet the burden of reparations. Hence Belgium was conceded Rwanda and Burundi by way of compensation in spite of the pre-war stench raised by Belgian methods of colonial administration in the Congo. The agreement was sanctified by Ruanda-Urundi being placed under a League of Nations mandate in 1924. The terms of the mandate insisted on the maintenance of a separate juridical personality for Ruanda-Urundi but allowed Belgians to administer the Mandated Territory from the Belgian Congo with whose customs and monetary system it was integrated.

### Indirect Rule

The Belgians relied upon indirect rule and at first made no attempt to curb the power of the Mwami and his Tutsi chiefs. On the contrary, they confined education and government posts to the Tutsi élite. Like the Germans they were infatuated by the subtle techniques of Tutsi rule and admired the Tutsi style of living.

Nevertheless they abolished domestic slavery in 1923 together with a number of Tutsi privileges. And in 1931 a clash occurred between the Belgian Governor, M. Voisin and the Mwami Musinga. Rwanda had experienced an extensive famine throughout 1929 and 1930 and the Governor claimed that the Mwami had been indifferent to the plight of his people and concerned only with the continued collection of his tributes. Another aspect of the clash was the Belgian decision to limit the power of the great chiefs by separating their property rights from their political authority over their tenants.

The Belgians acted swiftly, deposing Mwami Musinga and installing his 18 year old son Rudahigwa as Mwami Charles Mutara III. According to Rwanda custom the Mwami designated his successor amongst his sons. However the Belgians had ample precedent for breaking this custom since, historically, succession had been governed by struggles of power between the Mwami's sons aided and abetted by the Queen Mother.

While the deposition of the old Mwami and the designation of his successor clearly revealed where power lay in Rwanda, the Belgians did not follow this up with further attacks on the Tutsi feudal system. Rwanda is a poor and overpopulated country with a chronic balance of payments deficit. The introduction of coffee as a cash-crop provided some revenue but not enough to cover the ordinary budget deficit and Belgium had scant economic motives for taking a greater interest in Rwanda.

Rwanda suffered from Belgian paternalism and a three tier colonialism. The highly centralised Belgian colonial empire was ruled from Brussels where most major decisions were made. These were then transmitted to Leopoldville and from Leopoldville to Usumbura, Burundi, then the administrative centre for Ruanda-Urundi and the entrepôt centre for Rwanda, and from Usumbura to Rwanda. By the time policies reached Rwanda they were generally stale and long overdue.



At the end of the second world war Belgian responsibility for Rwanda was re-confirmed through a United Nations Trusteeship. During the war the Belgians had further confined the powers of the Mwami by limiting the jurisdiction and powers of the native courts. The post-war Belgian government sought to rectify past neglect of Ruanda-Urundi and in 1952 an ambitious 10 year development plan was instituted. However the Belgians were content to rely upon coercion to continue and expand the supervised growing of coffee, and the vital programmes of afforestation and anti-erosion works. Coffee cultivation was particularly unpopular because Belgian regulations were imposed on Hutu cultivators by Tutsi chiefs. Food surpluses had solved the problem of periodic famine but the pressure of men and animals on available land was threatening rapidly to transform Rwanda into a desert. The Belgians had neither the time nor the patience to educate the population as to the need for these measures.

Under pressure from the United Nations Trusteeship Council and the visiting UN Trusteeship Missions Belgium instituted indirect electoral colleges to choose members of advisory councils in each chieftaincy in 1952. These councils were extended to sub-chieftaincies in 1956 and in the following year a National Council for Rwanda was created whose membership the colonial government firmly controlled. The policy of favouring the Tutsi or at least not disturbing their privileged position was continued and as late as 1960 there were only three Hutu sub-chiefs and no Hutu chiefs out of 604 chiefs and sub-chiefs all appointed by the Mwami with the advice of the Belgian resident at his court.

The introduction of a limited electoral principle and the UN Visiting Missions with their observations and recommendations had more of an ideological than a practical impact. The Catholic Church which controlled most of the schools had begun to produce an educated Hutu élite and among this group democratic ideas of equal rights and equal opportunity and majority rule quickly penetrated and took hold. S. Naigiziki became the literary spokesman for the Hutu. One of the Hutu characters in his play *L'Optimiste* written in 1954 lists the injustices and oppression suffered by the Hutu and asks "When will we regularise our injustices?". His friend replies, "When the Hutu no longer has the soul of a serf. For that he must be re-born".<sup>1</sup>

### Political Awakening

A series of inter-related events gave rise to the form of mass political movements and paved the way for the sudden and dramatic transfer of power in Rwanda. The first impetus came from the riots in Leopoldville in January 1959, and the decision by Belgium to introduce democracy and accelerate the independence of the Belgian Congo. The realisation that a similar fate might be in store for Rwanda prompted Tutsi and Hutu to prepare for the eventual and inevitable showdown, the battle for control of the country once the Belgians had left.

The Tutsi had the obvious advantages of control of the administration

<sup>1</sup> Harroy, ed. *Le Ruanda-Urundi: Ses Ressources Naturelles, Ses Populations*. Brussels 1956, p. 136.

and civil service, the authority and prestige of the Mwami, greater wealth and education, and a previous history of favouritism shown them by the colonial régime. Their chief liability which in the end brought about their downfall was internal factionalism and rivalries and intrigues for power and influence. The Tutsi feared above all else to be regarded as an enemy of the Mwami since he could forfeit all their titles and cattle and they vied with each other in demonstrating their subservience and loyalty to him.

The Hutu were handicapped by their lack of education and experience, the need to build from scratch a political organisation outside the administrative system, and more than anything else by the submissiveness, humility and acceptance of inequality which had become such a part of Hutu character. Working in the Hutu's favour was their huge numerical predominance, the fervent commitment of their leaders to democracy and overthrow of the system, their vivid sense of injustice, and the awareness that if they failed to seize power before the independence of Rwanda they might remain forever under Tutsi domination. A further critical factor was the tacit support of the Catholic Church which had decided that in the end justice and inevitable victory were on the side of the Hutu. Most of the Hutu militants were former Catholic seminarians and their outstanding leader and spokesman, Gregoire Kayibanda, had been editor of a Church newspaper.

The opposing political forces had been building up for some time. The Tutsi formed the UNAR (*Union Nationale du Ruanda*) pro-monarchical party in September 1959 and petitioned the visiting United Nations Trusteeship Council Mission for rapid independence. The initially purely social *Mouvement Social Muhutu* founded by Mr. Kayibanda responded with a "Manifesto of the Bahutu", presented to the UN Mission. This Manifesto cited the injustices of the Tutsi régime and asked for independence to be delayed until they had been rectified. The preparation of the manifesto transformed the Hutu's embryonic organisation into PARMEHUTU (*Parti d'Emancipation des Hutus*).

### Political Warfare

On July 24, 1959, the 46 year old Mwami Mutara III died suddenly at Usumbura under mysterious circumstances without having designated his successor. A Tutsi clique, without consulting the colonial administration, chose by traditional methods the Mwami's nephew, Jean-Baptiste Ndahindurwa as the new Mwami Kigeri V. The Belgians acquiesced to this *fait accompli* and political warfare between Hutu and Tutsi erupted.

An extremist group at the court sought through terrorism to destroy the Hutu leadership and a series of particularly brutal political assassinations of prominent Hutu took place. PARMEHUTU mobilised its followers and for the first time the Hutus rose *en masse* against their feudal lords. It is said that the 1959 revolution was sparked by a circular letter from the Catholic Archbishop describing the inequalities between the Tutsi aristocracy and the Hutu as incompatible with Christian precepts. The Belgians declared a state of emergency and the Mwami fled to Usumbura and then Leopoldville. Thousands of Hutu and Tutsi fled the country or took refuge in special



camps and mission stations after a wave of hut burning and terrorism.

A United Nations Commission of Inquiry arrived in April 1960 and called for a conference at Brussels to reconcile the Rwanda political parties and fix the date for the country's first direct elections for the local communes. Most of the former chiefs and sub-chiefs had fled the country and the Belgians decided to replace them by direct election. PARMEHUTU combined with the small splinter party APROSOMA (*Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse*) to win 71 per cent of the seats in these elections. APROSOMA was a Hutu led party which had monarchist leanings and favoured reconciliation with the UNAR. During the fighting many Hutu had fled the country alongside their Tutsi lords and some Hutu of the older generation continued to prefer the monarchy.

The Belgians had now swung decisively behind PARMEHUTU in a sudden last minute change of policy. Mr. Kayibanda became Prime-Minister in October 1960 after a provisional National Assembly had been chosen in elections which the UNAR had boycotted.

The monarchists used their overseas political contacts to lobby members of the United Nations, particularly the Trusteeship Council. They had some success in posing as anti-Belgian African nationalists both with the Afro-Asians at the UN and with PAFMECA, the regional nationalist grouping. Two further conferences took place at UN instigation in December 1960 and January 1961 to try to produce an agreement between the Rwanda parties and to settle the future of the common institutions between Rwanda and Burundi. At the second of these conferences the APROSOMA leader swung over to UNAR and Kayibanda decided to play his trump card, the popular following of PARMEHUTU.

The Kayibanda government organised on January 28th, 1961, a mass meeting of communal councillors and burgomasters at Gitarama, which voted Rwanda a Republic, elected a new provisional National Assembly and a provisional President of the Republic.

The United Nations responded with another Mission which decided upon a double election, direct elections for a National Assembly and a referendum to decide upon the principle of the monarchy, and the person of the Mwami. The date for the Rwanda election was set for one week after a similar election in Burundi.

The UN sought to supervise the elections but the campaign was marked by widespread intimidation and terrorism. While the UNAR held large public meetings PARMEHUTU fought the campaign through its organization of cells built up by Mr. Kayibanda. The PARMEHUTU technique was to contact the most influential Hutu on each isolated hillside and make him responsible for his location. The technique worked and on a universal suffrage ballot PARMEHUTU and the republic won over 80 per cent of the vote in September 1961. Meanwhile in Burundi the monarchist anti-Belgian party used the Mwami's prestige to win 58 of 64 assembly seats.

Following the elections there was a new burst of terrorism and thousands of Tutsi fled the country fearing reprisals. The UNAR petitioned the UN, contesting the fairness of the elections, and claiming that the colonial administration had aided PARMEHUTU (which was certainly the case). The UNAR asked for independence to be delayed until fresh elections

could be held and the UN went so far as to insist that two UNAR ministers be included in the newly formed government.

A final conference was held at Addis-Ababa in April 1962 where the Rwanda and Burundi governments decided to seek independence separately while retaining certain of their common institutions such as the customs and monetary union and the coffee marketing fund. Mwami Mwambutsa of Burundi who first acceded to the throne in 1915 had succeeded in avoiding his neighbours' troubles by skilfully manipulating political groups and social reforms in order to maintain his rule. Yet the question of Tutsi minority rule, perhaps in a less aggravated form, is also the dominant issue in Burundi. Once separate independence was agreed upon, ideological strains between republican Rwanda and monarchist Burundi exacerbated by the presence of thousands of revanchist Tutsi refugees in Burundi, caused relations between the two countries to deteriorate rapidly.

Prior to independence, well over 100,000 Tutsi fled Rwanda to take refuge in Burundi, Uganda, Tanganyika and the Congo. But over 250,000 Tutsi remained in the country and the administration depended heavily upon them for civil servants, teachers, and clerks.

### Counter-revolution

Four centuries of hierarchical rule have taught the Tutsi that they are inherently superior to the humble, submissive and physically inferior Hutu whom they believe they have a divine right to rule. The Hutu social revolution prompted a counter-revolution amongst the hard-core Tutsi aristocratic élite which refused to reconcile itself to Hutu rule or to accept permanent exile. These monarchist counter-revolutionaries formed a secret terrorist organisation known as the Inyenzi or "cockroaches" which agitates among the refugees, particularly those in Burundi. The ex-Mwami lived in Kampala as a guest of the Kabaka of Buganda and became a focus for revanchist political activity among the Rwanda refugees in Uganda until the Uganda Government decided to deport him in August 1963 after pressure from the Rwanda government.

The ironies of Hutu-Tutsi relations are the result of two peoples living side by side for hundreds of years, speaking the same language, yet remaining apart. The Inyenzi leader, S. Rukeba, is himself a Hutu, who, having become a sub-chief under the old régime, was accepted as a lesser member of the superior race. On the other hand several Hutu ministers in the Rwanda government, including the President Mr. Kayibanda, have Tutsi wives. (There are few educated Hutu women.)

Apart from a few small cattle raids immediately after the independence of Rwanda on July 1st, 1962, the Inyenzi confined their efforts to agitation and the country enjoyed surprising calm for nearly 18 months. The dedicated government of 37 year old President Kayibanda instituted an austerity programme confining top salaries in the civil service to £1,000 per year. The choice by the President of a Volkswagen as the official car and his wife's continuing to work in the fields alongside the other women symbolised the government's desire to live within its extremely limited means.

The government has been less successful in persuading the population voluntarily to continue the projects compulsorily initiated under the Belgian



régime. One of the results was a disastrous fall in 1963 in the production of coffee and in its quality in a country where coffee provides two-thirds of all exports.

The greatest triumph of the Rwanda government was its completion of the social reforms which the Belgians had begun in 1954, abolishing the former feudal contracts. The *buhake* contract has been ended both legally and in practise and all cattle distributed between former patrons and clients with the latter receiving two-thirds. Also gone is the opprobrious *ibikingi* contract which gave holders of pastoral land conceded by the Mwami the right of tribute from their tenants.

Anxious to consolidate its position and suspicious of foreign intervention the government embarked on an extremely rapid Africanisation programme. Unfortunately, the number of qualified and experienced Hutu is extremely limited and the government was reluctant to promote more experienced Tutsi, although compelled to continue to rely on their services.

Politically, Rwanda adhered to the Treaty of Association with the Common Market and joined the *Union Africaine et Malgache* (UAM) bloc of French-speaking African states after being promised French cultural and technical assistance. The westward orientation of Rwanda's foreign policy was evident in these and other actions. Internally, a new constitution was promulgated based on a strong presidential system, and communal elections held in August 1963 which resulted in the PARMEHUTU party winning 95 per cent of the popular vote. While officially rejecting the idea of a one-party state, the régime comes very close to approaching one in reality.

This modest record of achievement during one and a half years of independence was shattered by the determination of the Inyenzi to return to their homeland and restore the monarchy. Driven by their pride the Inyenzi began to plot invasion. The terrible consequences of those invasion attempts have been almost by way of retribution. One of the Tutsi Catholic Bishops believes that "we Tutsi are being punished by our pride through our pride".

### 3. Invasion and Massacre

THE first invasion attempt by the Inyenzi occurred on November 25th, 1963, when 3,000 Tutsi refugees in Burundi began a three day march towards the Rwanda border "to return to their country". The marchers included old men, women and children, as well as three truckloads of arms. The refugees had sold foodstuffs supplied to them by voluntary agencies in order to obtain the arms. The marchers were seen by Catholic and Protestant missionaries and UN refugee officials and the Burundi government was notified and intervened to turn back the refugees. It is not clear whether it was the intention of the Inyenzi leaders actually to invade Rwanda or to provoke a slaughter of civilians by Rwanda troops in the hope that this would incite world opinion against the Rwanda régime. It must also be remembered that many Tutsi believe that Rwanda is "their" country in an ordained sense and that if they return the previously submissive Hutu will once again passively accept their rule.

Following this abortive attempt, relations between the Burundi and Rwanda governments moved rapidly towards a point of no return. A conference in mid-December on the allocation of foreign exchange and import licences between the two countries using a single currency resulted in utter failure. Burundi demanded 60 per cent of the import licences for a five year period on the basis of her more favourable export position. Rwanda proposed an interim of one year 50-50 split. The resulting impasse prompted the Burundi government unilaterally to declare the dissolution of the monetary and customs union.

On the night of December 20th, 1963, only a day after the break-up of the conference, a band of Tutsi invaders armed only with bows, arrows and home-made rifles infiltrated across the Rwanda-Burundi border at Nemba. They first rallied local Tutsi to increase their numbers to 600 and then attacked a Rwanda military camp under construction at Agako, killing four Rwanda soldiers while the others fled leaving their arms behind. The invaders commandeered two jeeps and some light arms and ammunition and moved northwards towards Kigali, the smallest capital in the world with a population of 7,000 and one tarmac street. A party of European tourists driving towards Kigali only realised that they were in the midst of a raiding party when they received an arrow in the panel of their Volkswagen, after which they quickly departed. The Inyenzi are violently anti-European, considering with reason that the Belgians were responsible for the installation of a Hutu régime in Rwanda.

The invaders were intercepted by a group of Rwanda soldiers reinforced by their Belgian military advisors at Kanzenze bridge on the River Nyabarungo, 15 miles from the capital, where a full scale inter-tribal skirmish fought with modern weapons ensued. The Tutsi invaders were routed, the majority being killed and the others fleeing into the bush.

The initial reaction of the Rwanda government to the news of the invasion attempt was a paralysing panic. The recently appointed Rwandan Commandant of the Garde Nationale, a lieutenant two years out of Officers'



School, handed over command to his Belgian military advisor who rallied the panic-stricken soldiery to halt the invaders.

Once the invaders had been repulsed the Rwanda government remained convinced that the attack was part of a concerted plot from several directions to overthrow the régime and restore the monarchy. They suspected the Burundi government of collusion in the attack, although this was adamantly denied by Burundi Prime Minister Ngendandumwe in reply to an appeal made on December 22nd by the UN Secretary-General to the Burundi Government to do all it could to stop armed incursions into Rwanda.

### Counter-measures

The first counter-measure of the Rwanda government was to order the arrest of prominent Tutsi throughout the country and have them taken to government prisons. Many of these Tutsi hostages were released after being severely beaten, but those suspected of collaboration with the invaders were shot without public trial. Those executed include all Tutsi whose names had been included on a list found on the body of a Congolese mercenary killed with the Tutsi invaders. This list presumably contained the names of the government the invaders hoped to install and the Rwanda authorities promptly executed the leading members of the opposition monarchist UNAR ministers, UNAR deputies in the National Assembly and several leading Tutsi civil servants mentioned in the list.

The defence of Rwanda poses insuperable problems. The 1,000 man *Garde Nationale* was fully committed at the frontier posts and the capital. The mountainous nature of the country, its open borders with no natural demarcations on three sides, and the lack of any villages enable invaders to penetrate readily and to advance. Add to this a potential "fifth column" of 200,000 Tutsi remaining in the country and the fear of a two or even three-pronged attack. While the invaders' actual plans and capacities involved little more than a tribal foray, they still posed a major threat to a country as weak and fragile as Rwanda. The ultimate defence of Rwanda could only be assured by the willingness of the Hutu population to congregate and resist their former overlords.

The Rwanda government therefore sought to organise the "self-defence" of the country by sending a minister with full powers to each of the ten prefectures. The ministers worked in conjunction with the local prefects and sub-prefects and elected burgomasters to rally the Hutu living in individual family clusters on isolated hillsides. Road blocks were hastily thrown up and manned by civilians.

The subsequent atrocious reprisals and mass killings which have been so widely reported depended almost entirely on the situation within each prefecture and how the ministers' orders were interpreted by local officials. Thus the situation was under control in Kibungo prefecture on the Tanganyika border where the Catholic White Fathers prevailed upon the prefect and the burgomasters not to incite the Hutu population against the local Tutsi. Hutu and Tutsi in this prefecture celebrated Christmas Mass together and a Tutsi terrorist who had taken refuge with a local Tutsi family was turned over to the authorities. Yet the degree of fear was such that the White Fathers were convinced that the burning of a

single Tutsi hut would have prompted the entire Tutsi population of the prefecture to take refuge.

Elsewhere panic combined with local circumstances to produce mass slaughter. The worst instance was Gikongoro prefecture where the dense tropical forest provides an open border with Burundi. Here local Tutsi had been boasting for several days prior to the invasion of their hopes of returning to power and restoring the monarchy. During the invasion, reports were received in this area that Kigali had fallen and that the former Mwami, now resident in Nairobi, Kenya, had been restored to power. The Hutu believed that other Inyenzi were about to cross the open border and rally the local Tutsi around the ancestral home of the Tutsi kings of Rwanda located at Nyanza, the former headquarters of the prefecture. This prefecture of 300,000 inhabitants including perhaps 45,000 Tutsi had experienced the most stringent and intensive Tutsi rule due to its proximity to the royal residence. The decision to move the headquarters of the prefecture from Nyanza to Gikongoro had been intended to erase the stigma of former Tutsi domination.

### Government Version

The Rwanda government version is that the Hutu population ran amok and that the recently appointed and very inexperienced local authorities completely lost control of the situation. Other accounts blame the local elected burgomasters for organising the reprisals and they cite as evidence the traditional submissiveness to authority of the Hutu and the fact that reprisals ceased on the borders of one commune or prefecture. Perhaps the truth is a mixture of the two versions. Having organised the local Hutu population for self-defence the burgomasters may have then given them orders to attack Tutsi collaborators. These orders may then have been taken literally, to mean attacking all Tutsi.

The exact numbers killed will never be known. The local population, using whatever arms were available, mostly hoes and long whetted knives for cutting grass known as pangas, caused hideous atrocities and mutilations. Bodies were thrown into nearby rivers and streams, dumped in piles along the side of the road, and left to be scavenged by wild animals. The most reliable estimates are between 10,000 and 14,000 slaughtered, including Hutu — some Tutsi fought back.<sup>1</sup> 5,000 are believed to have been killed in the vicinity of Cyanika Catholic Mission Station in Gikongoro prefecture. The official Rwanda government figure is 350 invaders killed and 400 civilian deaths, some of which they attribute to the invaders.

One of the factors accounting for the ferocity of the reprisals is the temperament of the Tutsi. Above all they pride themselves on their self-control expressed particularly through impassiveness. The Hutu are regarded with contempt because of their emotionalism and inability to control its

<sup>1</sup> Publisher's note. Mr. Dorsinville, U Thant's special representative in his report issued in New York on March 4th estimates that the dead might be in the region of 1-3,000 (*Times*, March 5th, 1964). Mr. Segal, who wrote this pamphlet in Kampala, has unfortunately not had access to the Dorsinville report and does not wish to comment on the basis of newspaper summaries.



are heavily guarded. Even so, on February 1st another Inyenzi attack occurred on the customs post at Bugarama on the Burundi border, and four Rwanda customs officials were reported killed. The attack is believed to have originated from Burundi. U Thant promised on February 7th to send Mr. Dorsinville again to see the Rwanda and Burundi governments to discuss ways of improving the situation.

The latest UN estimate is that there are 150,000 Rwanda refugees outside the country, including 42,000 in Burundi, 60,000 in Kivu Province of the Congo, nearly 36,000 in Uganda and 12,000 in Tanganyika. These estimates are undoubtedly conservative, since many refugees remain in hiding or have been partially absorbed into local villages, a process made possible by the long-standing presence of Tutsi in Uganda and Tanganyika.

The plight of these refugees is extremely unfortunate. They are receiving a bare subsistence diet of beans, millet flour and a little milk but no meat or fish. Medical services are hopelessly inadequate. The Uganda government is making an extremely generous effort without significant external assistance to provide for its refugees and eventually to resettle them within Uganda. The Burundi, Congo and Tanganyika governments lack the administrative and financial resources for a comparable undertaking and the refugees in those countries are kept alive largely through the efforts of various voluntary agencies.

The presence of this large number of refugees on its borders is a constant security problem for the government of Rwanda and for neighbouring governments. The pitiful immediate situation of the refugees and the lack of any plans for resettlement except in Uganda make their camps fertile seedbeds for Inyenzi propaganda which promises a triumphal return to their homeland.

The number of Tutsi remaining in Rwanda is not known. The last official figure was a 1956 estimate of 393,931 Tutsi in Rwanda.<sup>1</sup> Since that date probably upwards of 250,000 have fled the country, including 50,000 during the latest massacres. The remaining 120,000-140,000<sup>2</sup> are not allowed to leave the country since the Rwanda government fears that once out they will be recruited by the Inyenzi. Particularly as a result of the latest flood of refugees, many families are divided with wives and children outside the country and husbands remaining behind or killed.

Those Tutsi remaining within Rwanda are in an impossible position. Although still heavily reliant on Tutsi officials for administration and education, the Rwanda government has no confidence in their loyalty. Even under the most stable conditions their prospects for promotion in the civil service would be severely limited. As it is they are branded as traitors and are subject to intimidation by the Inyenzi for supporting the régime. Only a handful manage to leave the country secretly and less than twenty Tutsi refugees a week are now entering Uganda.

<sup>1</sup> *Le Ruanda-Urundi*, Brussels, 1959, Office of Information and Public Relations for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> The UN estimates that there are over 200,000 Tutsi left in Rwanda. This figure is based on their figures on the number that have fled. There is no way of reaching an exact figure: perhaps my estimates should be qualified.

The Rwanda government professes to believe that Hutu and Tutsi can continue to live together, although many of its own officials believe, like the prefect at Kisenyi, that this is no longer possible; but the same prefect continues to employ four Tutsi in his office. To an outside observer the extent and horror of the killings would in itself be bound to rule out any reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi. Yet they share a common language and have lived side by side for four centuries. After the 1960-61 fighting Hutu and Tutsi were known spontaneously to help one another rebuild burned huts. But in the present situation there can be no real chance of any of the refugees being allowed to return to Rwanda.

### Economic Disaster

The dimensions of the tragedy extend to the Rwanda economy where the effect of the security situation and the break-up of the customs and monetary union with Burundi has been to render the cash sector virtually non-existent. Last year the coffee crop was 35 per cent of the value of the 1962 harvest and the average return to individual producers fell to thirty shillings a year. This is practically the only source of monetary income from Rwanda peasants, except for those living near the border who can smuggle their exports out and take advantage of higher prices outside the country. The loss of purchasing power is reflected in a marked lowering of the standard of living. Stores are practically empty of consumer goods, imports of cotton piece-goods have halted, and, whereas formerly there was an average of one lorry-load of salt a day from Uganda to Rwanda, there have been no salt-carrying lorries for over two months. Even *before* the massacres and the break up of the union with Burundi, Rwanda's economic situation was catastrophic. Burundi's situation is almost as bad and the coffee crop there was equally disastrous.

The Rwanda-Burundi franc, which is still in use, has slumped to half its official value of 7 to the East African Shilling and, like the government budget, is maintained only by a Belgian subsidy. If and when Rwanda tries to create its own currency its value will depreciate further. Meanwhile the government is vainly trying to uphold the official exchange rate through a system of import licensing and the granting of a transport monopoly to a Belgian company, *Agence Maritime Internationale*. The effect is to encourage smuggling and to deprive the government of much needed customs revenue, while private investment has ceased completely. Fortunately the subsistence sector of the economy is still flourishing and food supplies are ample, although malnutrition is widespread.



## 4. Alternatives to Annihilation

**F**OUR measures are required to retrieve Rwanda from her present situation, avert the total annihilation of the Tutsi as a people and restore some semblance of peace, hope and sanity.

First and most imperative, effective military measures are needed to control the Inyenzi and prevent further invasion attempts. Were such attempts to take place, the degree of bitterness, fear, hatred and panic within Rwanda is such that they would almost inevitably be followed by reprisals equivalent to genocide of the Tutsi population within Rwanda. It is highly unlikely that the Rwanda government, even if it wished to, could prevent reprisals on this scale from taking place if the Inyenzi again attempted an invasion.

### A Cordon Sanitaire

What is needed is a military *cordon sanitaire* round Rwanda to prevent further invasion attempts. The Uganda government is already effectively patrolling its border with Rwanda and is moving the refugees out of the danger zone. The Congo and Tanganyika governments have made similar efforts but are handicapped by their internal military and administrative difficulties. Effective pressure should be brought to bear on the Burundi government to do likewise, even though the military forces at its disposal may not be adequate to police its frontier with Rwanda. However the Burundi government has yet to make a serious effort, and the Organisation for African Unity, UN and neighbouring African governments need to make a stronger impression upon the Burundi authorities. The Charter of African Unity clearly forbids the authorities of one independent African state allowing its territory to be used as a military base directed against another independent African state, yet Burundi has been used in this way by the Inyenzi with or without the knowledge of the Burundi government. Since Burundi is critically dependent upon Lake Tanganyika and the railway to Dar-es-Salaam for its exports and imports, it is within the power of the Tanganyika and the other East African governments who control Burundi's access to the sea to bring decisive pressure upon that government.

Pressure from this direction is likely to be more active than that currently being exercised by western governments. Burundi has recently put its Army on a full military alert and sealed off and evacuated a buffer zone along the frontier with Rwanda. This action followed a unanimous resolution in the National Assembly accusing United States, British, French and Belgian diplomats of interfering in Burundi's internal affairs and a government order restricting them to the capital of Usumbura.

If the neighbouring states cannot themselves provide this *cordon sanitaire* there is sufficient justification for military intervention by the UN or the Organisation for African Unity, since unless this *cordon* is provided there is every likelihood of renewed slaughter as well as the intervention of foreign powers. There is no evidence for the rumours that the Communist Chinese have been providing assistance to the Inyenzi but there are

ample motives for such aid on their part in the future. Rwanda has recognised Nationalist China, formally banned communism in its constitution, permitted the West German government to install a Radio "Voice of West Germany" on its territory, and its government is staunchly Catholic and pro-western. The Burundi government has recognised Communist China, extended an invitation to Chou En Lai to visit Usumbura during his African tour, and refused to join the UAM group of countries on the grounds that it is a neo-colonialist pro-French bloc. The Chinese Communists could at little cost subsidise chaos in Central Africa by aiding the Inyenzi to destroy a pro-western régime. UN or inter-African military intervention may be necessary to prevent the intrusion of East-West conflict into the Rwanda situation.

The costs of financing a military *cordon sanitaire* need not be prohibitive since the military force required would be small in number (no more than 2,500 men including those supplied by neighbouring governments) and the duration of their stay would be limited. Once the *cordon sanitaire* is imposed it is then possible to consider the ultimate solution to ensure the survival of the Tutsi.

### Resettlement

The 150,000 Tutsi refugees on Rwanda's borders must be permanently resettled in the neighbouring African countries and those Tutsi still in Rwanda given their freedom to leave the country and resettle elsewhere. There can be no hope of the refugees returning to Rwanda and the lives of those Tutsi who remain within Rwanda will constantly be in jeopardy so long as the refugees are not resettled. Yet while the refugees remain in makeshift camps on the borders of their homeland their despair will make invasion proposals tempting.

While the Rwanda government will undoubtedly be embarrassed by a mass exodus of Tutsi, there is every indication that it would find this situation eminently acceptable. There is no way of estimating the number of Tutsi who would leave Rwanda given the chance and choice of resettling elsewhere. The ratio of Tutsi to Hutu varies considerably throughout the country: in 1956 45 per cent of the Tutsi resided in the prefectures of Nyanza (Gikongoro) and Astrida, while only 12 per cent lived in the densely populated northern prefectures.<sup>1</sup> It is conceivable that in those places where the ratio of Tutsi to Hutu is very low and feudal rule was less intense, many Tutsi may well elect to remain within Rwanda. What is important is that all be given the choice—with the prospect of installing themselves somewhere else.

Fortunately Rwanda's neighbours, with the exception of Burundi, have large quantities of unused arable land. The Congo and Tanganyika are actually under-populated, with the Congo having 5 times the population of Rwanda in an area 90 times as large. The cost of resettling the Tutsi will have to be borne by non-African governments and international organisations but the neighbouring African states can make the vitally significant donations of land.

<sup>1</sup> *Le Ruanda-Urundi*, Brussels, 1959.



The Tutsi are far from being ideal settlers since they are a pastoral people demanding large areas of land, arrogant, aristocratic, lazy and disdainful of manual labour. But they are not by any means intractable. Once they have been convinced that there can be no military return to Rwanda, the vast majority of this clever, intelligent and ambitious people will opt for resettlement rather than a permanent existence in refugee camps. Already 8,000 Tutsi in Uganda have agreed to resettle with their cattle in Toro and Ankole. Those living in the refugee camps in the Oruchinga Valley of Uganda have been planting food and some cash crops and building permanent homes.

Nor do the Tutsi necessarily make bad neighbours as settlers. The Ngara district in the West Lake Province of Tanganyika has a considerable settlement of Tutsi whose relations with the local Bantu population are extremely amicable, including extensive intermarriage and sharing of property and cattle. There the colonial régime quickly introduced legislation reducing or abolishing Tutsi feudal privileges and Tutsi social attitudes changed accordingly. The Tutsi subject to resettlement bring with them considerable cultural liabilities, the worst being their pride, but they are not irredeemable as a people and their very liabilities can become assets for resettlement if properly channelled.

The costs of such a resettlement programme can only be very roughly estimated. Nevertheless neighbouring African states should not be expected to contribute administratively or financially—given the stringency of their resources and the absolute priority of their own domestic needs. Already the Uganda government is spending considerable sums to deal with a refugee problem which is beyond its meagre resources and is in no way its responsibility.

Some considerations on the cost of resettlement can be derived from recent experience in East Africa. Much depends on whether land is to be used for cultivation, mixed farming or pasture, whether it can be cleared by hand or whether machinery is required, whether tsetse fly need be eradicated or prevented from re-entering the area scheduled for resettlement, and the types of crops to be grown. The principal cost item is transport for the settlers. This will be very expensive for the Tutsi since in all probability large numbers will have to be transported out of Rwanda and Burundi. The very high population density of Burundi and its own internal Hutu-Tutsi problem make it desirable that as few Tutsi as possible be resettled in that country. They can best be redistributed in Tanganyika and Kivu Province of the Congo, while Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro and perhaps the "lost counties" disputed between the Baganda and Bunyoro can best accommodate the refugees presently within Uganda. The average real cost of settlement schemes in Uganda for Rwanda refugees has been £10 per head. Assuming a similar figure the cost of resettling 200,000 Tutsi is £2 million. But if the Tutsi were to be resettled on a pastoral basis and allowed to retain their present herds the costs could be significantly less. Unfortunately 90 per cent of the Tutsi cattle are subject to cysterocosis for which there is no cure. The meat is hygienic if boiled but is then unpalatable for tinning.

The original intention of the Uganda government prior to the recent

influx of refugees was to resettle 12,000 Tutsi in the Oruchinga Valley where the first refugee camps were provided in 1961. Doubts were expressed about this scheme due to the low rainfall probability of the area (20 per cent probability of less than 30 inches of rain per year) and the rapid soil deterioration resulting from such intensive settlement.

The Uganda government was on the verge of resolving the problem of its Rwanda refugees until the recent influx disrupted its Tutsi resettlement programme. Moreover for security reasons the Uganda government decided after the invasion attempt to collect all the Rwanda refugees living dispersed in villages near the Rwanda frontier and concentrate them in the Oruchinga Valley reception centre. There are now 22,000 refugees in this 17 by 7 mile enclave and they exist on subsistence rations. Medical and other services are hopelessly inadequate.

The Uganda government is negotiating for land with local government authorities to resettle the Oruchinga refugees, many of whom have lived in Uganda for several years. While local authorities are willing to contribute land they are opposed to the Tutsi settling in villages of their own and prefer that they should be redistributed throughout an area to avoid large concentrations of refugees. The Uganda government for security reasons prefers the refugees to be resettled in villages of their own where it will be easier to control any agitation by the Inyenzi.

But the chief obstacle to further resettlement is financial. The Uganda government has already spent over £350,000 on the refugees. It estimates that £180,000 is needed to complete the resettlement programme. To date the only large-scale external assistance Uganda has received has been \$150,000 promised by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, another \$50,000 promised for emergency aid for the recent arrivals and £10,000 from OXFAM. Uganda has pressing development needs of her own and should neither be asked nor expected to bear the costs of resettlement. There is a clear-cut case for international assistance to resettle the refugees, especially in Uganda where the administrative framework for such a programme is already in existence.

A successful resettlement programme should in time eliminate the need for a military *cordon sanitaire* to be maintained. Once the refugees have been given land and opportunity the Inyenzi propaganda will lose its impact. At present the vast majority of the refugees have renounced hope of returning to Rwanda but, being denied the possibility of resettlement, have succumbed to the day to day despairing existence of refugees. Unless a resettlement programme is mounted, the dignity and very survival of the Tutsi as a people is in jeopardy.

### Monetary Reform

The third necessary measure is monetary reform (including devaluation) to restore the Rwanda economy to a semblance of normal activity. Following the break-up of the customs and monetary union with Burundi Rwanda is faced with the alternatives of creating its own currency or linking with an external monetary zone. Rwanda has literally no reserves except those Belgium chooses to provide and the chronic balance of payments and budget deficit will undermine the value of any Rwanda



currency. The present attempt to maintain the official value of the Rwanda-Burundi franc at seven to the shilling while the free market rate is fourteen serves only to stifle legitimate commerce, encourage smuggling, and compel the government to use its scarce foreign exchange for uneconomic imports. Rwanda has added to its difficulties by granting *Agence Maritime Internationale*, a 10 year monopoly on all transport to and from Rwanda towards Uganda. Presumably the government took this action to be assured of customs duty on exports and imports but the company immediately doubled prices, giving an added incentive to smugglers.

One possibility would be for Rwanda to enter the East Africans Customs and Monetary Union of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, adopting the East African shilling and East African tariffs rather than attempting to create a Rwanda currency and customs duties. Rwanda lacks the purchasing power and population necessary for industrialization on more than a small-scale. Rwanda and Burundi have both had a customs union with the Congo which favoured the development of industry in the Congo. As a small non-industrial country far from the sea it is in the interest of Rwanda to import from as wide and cheap a range of markets as possible. However, through entering the East African common market and monetary union Rwanda would lose some of its freedom to import in exchange for access to a strong currency. Thus Rwanda would grant duty-free entry for manufactured goods from East Africa in exchange for membership in the East African Currency Board and use of its monetary reserves. Were Rwanda to adopt such a course its present transportation orientation towards Uganda and the Indian Ocean ports of Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam would be extended. (It was Rwanda's determination to escape from commercial and economic dependence on Usumbura which contributed to the disintegration of the economic union and explains the Rwandans' insistence on developing the trade route to Kampala and Mombasa instead of Usumbura and Dar-es-Salaam.) The costs of exporting and importing via Mombasa or Dar-es-Salaam are less than using the Congo Atlantic Ocean port of Matadi and were it not for the present preferential duty East African goods would be cheaper than Congolese products within Rwanda.

As a concomitant to joining the East African customs and monetary union Rwanda should abrogate the transport monopoly conceded to *Agence Maritime Internationale*, which has hindered East African merchants from trading with Rwanda and has failed to benefit the Rwanda economy.

The acceptance of closer economic relations with its East African neighbours need not endanger the independence of Rwanda. If and when the East African countries decide to create an East African Federation Rwanda would be free to choose to enter such a federation or to retain only an economic association. Moreover the alternative policy of attempting to create a Rwanda currency based upon reserves supplied by foreign governments would compromise the sovereignty of Rwanda more than would association with East Africa.

#### Long-range Development

Fourthly, a long-range development plan is required to bring into

cultivation currently unused arable land, increase agricultural productivity, and exploit the mineral and tourist potential of the country. Even if the Tutsi problem is resolved, Rwanda will remain the most densely populated Country in Africa South of the Sahara with the lowest per capita income (£14 per year). The present population is expected to double within 23 years. Even the present pathetic level of medical services (there are only 13 doctors in the country) has succeeded in reducing infant mortality while the birth rate is among the highest in the world. Artificial methods of population control are not feasible in Rwanda due to the strength of Catholicism and the people's very high regard for children. In a subsistence economy where land is the only form of security, additional children help stave off the prospect of famine in old age. The present rate of emigration provides an outlet for 6 per cent of the annual increase in population, and cannot be significantly increased, because of unemployment in neighbouring countries. Given the present level of resources and technology, if the population continues to grow at its present rate the inevitable result will be a Malthusian solution to population control. Historically, famine, plague and war have produced a rough state of balance between land and population in Rwanda. But with intelligent economic planning and implementation Rwanda need not return to this far from idyllic state of nature.

Rwanda's economic development at present depends entirely on foreign aid which is both unco-ordinated and competitive. The major donors have been Belgium and the European Common Market. The United Kingdom has confined its assistance to a few offers of scholarships. The United States, as well as making scholarships available, has pumped in a considerable quantity of food surpluses.

Rwanda has considerable potential for the expansion of the growing of high-quality Arabica coffee and the cultivation of tea for which the world market situation is at the moment particularly promising. Several areas of the country have unused arable land which can be brought into cultivation through village settlements which would demonstrate to Rwandans the economic and social values of communal life. A proper geological survey remains to be undertaken and Rwanda's present mining production represents only a small proportion of potential output. Rwanda's verdant mountains, azure lakes and outstanding Kagira National Park for wild life afford opportunities for the development of tourism.

Rwanda benefits from a homogeneity few other African states possess. There is only one national language (Kinyarwanda and French are the official languages) and there is a high degree of social cohesion. The impact of the social revolution can be used to mobilise the Hutu population for community development. The breaking of feudal contracts and bonds gives the Rwanda government a freedom to experiment with systems of land tenure that other African governments harassed by traditional attitudes towards land may envy.

The Rwanda government to date has failed to take advantage of the potential for change released by the social revolution. It has been unwilling to continue the reafforestation, anti-erosion and supervised growing of coffee programmes maintained by the Belgians through Tutsi coercion. It has failed to recognise the absolute necessity of these programmes for



the development of the country. Indeed if the anti-erosion programme is not renewed population pressure will threaten large-scale famine in less than ten years. The Rwanda government has only begun to accept the challenge of maintaining through persuasion these long-hated programmes operated in the past only by force. All its political authority and skills must be devoted to this task.

Rwanda's major needs are skilled personnel and small-scale agricultural projects rather than large injections of capital. Rwanda has neither the administrative capacity nor the development projects to absorb large amounts of aid. There is no place for Volta River schemes, only farmers who need to be taught how to plant tea or organise and operate coffee co-operatives. The need for skilled manpower is particularly critical. Rwanda Africanised its administration more quickly than almost any other African state, yet has fewer qualified and experienced civil servants. The Hutu régime inherited power with almost no trained Hutu and the overwhelming political need to end the Tutsi domination in the civil service. The creation of a new University at Butare manned by Dominican Fathers from Canada will help meet some of Rwanda's requirements, but a crash programme is required to train agricultural assistants, health and community development workers, and educational and medical personnel. It is to be hoped that the experts needed for this crash programme can be found from the Belgians who still have over 200 technicians in Rwanda, and from French and UN advisers at present in key positions.

Rwanda is not in a position to refuse any external offers of assistance but some aid it has received has not been directed towards the interests of the country. Particularly objectionable was the action of West Germany in pressing upon Rwanda a 50 Kw radio transmitter in exchange for its use for broadcasting throughout Africa by *Deutsche Welle* (The Voice of Germany). Rwanda is thus saddled with a radio transmitter far beyond its needs which it can neither staff nor maintain while the West German government obtains a cheap outlet for its propaganda in Africa.

What is required is for each of the major interested foreign powers to commit themselves to supporting a sector of an economic plan for Rwanda thus avoiding competition and waste. For the time being at least some direct budget support seems essential if administrative collapse is to be avoided. Yet external aid of a modest total sum of £3 million per year could give the country a moderately optimistic future. Otherwise we have still to see the full dimensions of the tragedy of Rwanda.

#### **To avert disaster**

These four measures: a military *cordon sanitaire*, resettlement of the refugees, monetary reform within Rwanda, and long-term economic development and aid, are essential in order to avert disaster on a scale far beyond that which has occurred to date. Rwanda has no particular strategic or economic value to justify receiving such assistance. However, the only alternative to taking these measures is the prolongation and deepening of chaos; a chaos which in some ways implicates the entire human race because it is based upon man's inhumanity to man.

The greatest danger is that if these measures are not taken the present

chaos will engulf Burundi. The latter country remains under Tutsi domination through the political adroitness of 53 year old Mwami Mwambutsa who first came to the throne in 1915. The assassination of Crown-Prince Louis Rwagasore in October 1961 deprived the country of the most probable successor to the Mwami and the only politician likely to be capable of holding it together after his death. The present heir-apparent is the 18 year old son of the Mwami who has spent most of his life in Europe and has little authority or popular following in Burundi.

While the ratio of Tutsi to Hutu is lower in Burundi than in Rwanda the Burundi Tutsi are relatively wealthier than were their Rwanda brethren. Burundi has only gradually begun to modify the feudal contracts of cattle and land binding the Hutu to serfdom. Whether Burundi can achieve social reform without social revolution depends very much on conditions in Rwanda. The Tutsi population of Burundi has been swollen to close to 400,000 by the influx of refugees and one of the conditions of their security is stability in Rwanda and the restoration of normal relations between Rwanda and Burundi.

Wanton murder has been required to bring Rwanda to the attention of the outside world. Whatever the Tutsi may deserve because of their past conduct and attitudes they do not merit annihilation as a people. Rwanda has more to contribute to the world than stories of mass slaughter. It should be given the chance to make that contribution.



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